not involve the deliberate agentive "take the action of causing oneself to be so" or "decide to cause oneself to be so." "Cause" is used here as in "be the cause one's own ruin."
Our meaning "naturally" derives etymologically from the non-agentive causative as in: no longer just "human." In a paradoxical way he is taken to be unartificially and non-assertively "natural" himself, part of the natural process, no longer a humanly motivated agent outside the processes of nature. He is not, then, perceived to "become Nature." He is perceived to be "natural." Hence the verbal use in the famous passage in Laozi 老子： 天下謂我自然 "all the world regards me as just natural," 11 at which point zi ran "be natural" comes to refer to the metaphysical result of the sage's ability to wu wei 無為 "be non-assertive in action" which goes well into colloquial English as "not trying anything funny." And from a philosophical point of view it is crucial to realise that in this usage, zi ran is exactly NOT "adjectival," the verb does not ascribe a state but a way of behaving.
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More currently, and less paradoxically, human action can relate to this zi ran as an hypostatised, almost reified, object, as in Hanfeizi 13 : 隨 自然 "If he follows Nature/naturalness ... ," together with Hanfeizi 14 : 因 自然"base oneself on Nature/naturalness," and Huainanzi 淮南子: 反 自 然 "revert to Nature/naturalness" 15 , where the object is clearly nominal, and the reference would seem to be to some hypostatised, abstract notion of "what is so of itself" which one might well be tempted to render in English as capitalised "Nature," or-perhaps a little over-explicitly-as "naturalness."
More subtly complex is Guanzi 管子 16 : 得天之道。其事若自然。"If one has attained to the Way of Heaven (Tian zhi Dao) one's undertakings will be like natural processes." The technical term zi ran can be preceded by possessive pronouns, as in Huainanzi 17 : 因其自然 "base oneself on one's Nature," and also in Shishuoxinyu 世說新語 18 :所以明其自然故也. "this was because he understood his Nature." One notes incidentally that in such constructions "naturalness" ceases to be a natural translation. At times, this kind of discourse identifies natural patterns that come close to what in our parlance would be construed as "regular patterns of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature." Thus also Huainanzi 19 : 夫舟浮於水， 車轉 於陸，此勢之自然也。"now a boat will float on water, and a vehicle will roll along on land. This is the nature of these situations."
In Hanfeizi 20 : 恃萬物之自然而不敢為也 "rely on the Nature of the myriad things and not dare to engage in assertive action," Huainanzi 21 : 因天地之自然 "base oneself on the Nature prevailing in Heaven and Earth > the world," and Huainanzi 22 : 隨天地自然 "follow what is so of itself (> the natural laws prevailing) in Heaven and Earth," the reference is to "what is so of itself" within specified domains.
We may safely conclude that nominalised uses of zi ran are already common in pre-Buddhist literature. This nominal concept forms a crucial part of ancient Chinese ways of construing the overall structure of the world. And towards the end of that pre-Buddhist period we have Ruan Ji 阮籍 (AD 210-263) ascribes to zi ran an active role as an agent of cosmological development: 天地生於自然 "Heaven and Earth are born from what-is-naturally-so (zi ran)." 23 Here, then, zi ran is no longer an abstraction, but rather an hypostatised metaphysical entity and physical agent. And one notes as an important detail, that the phrase zi ran here still does not refer collectively to the physical world as a whole.
C. THE COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE CONCEPT OF NATURE
It has long become customary to ask such questions as "Does Chinese have the concept of Nature?" and so on. Such a question is problematic. To start with, there is no one clear notion of Greek phusis, or of Latin natura, or indeed of English Nature. A look at the justly famous Greek-English Lexicon by Liddell, Scott, and Jones, the Oxford Latin Dictionary, or indeed the Oxford English Dictionary will quickly confirm this. Thus the question may sound natural, but it only begins to make any sense to the extent that it is accompanied by a clarification of what exactly the question refers to. The things and creatures constituting Nature, are wan wu 萬 物 "the myriad things/creatures," and the all-embracing term for Nature as the universe of such things would be tian di 天地 "Heaven and Earth," the landscape these things may form and which may be enjoyed as "nature," would be shan shui 山水 "landscape > nature" or, more recently, feng jing 風景 "natural scenery > nature." One could go on along these lines identifying the terminological repertoires, conceptual systèmes de relations sémantiques, offered by the Chinese language at different stages of its development for the different kinds of meanings of the English word "nature."
So then, what needs to be discussed are not individual Western words and the presence, or absence, of equivalents elsewhere. Even supposing that a sufficiently clear notion of Nature were to be specified, the appropriate question to ask would still be more like: "what kinds of distinctions did the Chinese language make in the course of its recorded history within the general semantic field of regular patterns to which things are said to conform everywhere?" Within this semantic field, then, one may indeed usefully compare the distinctions made by different peoples, by different individuals, in different places, and at different times. It is never simply going to be a matter of asking: "Do they or don't they have the concept X?"
Now it turns out that, in traditional times, Chinese thinkers used a wide range of expressions to refer to the observed or imagined regularities of of the physical world of things, including or sometimes excluding the world of human feelings, actions, and social situations. The Thesaurus Linguae Sericae (TLS) documents the conceptual history of at least the following:
1. Ze 則 RULE refers to a rule or regulation for human behaviour, and then, by extension, to the predictable and regular rules followed by all things. 18. Tian zhi ze 天之則 HEAVEN('S) RULE probably refers to the rules imposed by Heaven, rather than the rules followed by Heaven itself, but the matter will need to be argued out in detail. 讀書以觀聖賢之意； 因聖人之意， 以觀自然之理。 The reading of books is in order to get a view of the ideas/thoughts of the sages and worthies, and on the basis of the ideas of the sages to get a view of the underlying natural principles. 53 Behind the messages of the sages of old, Zhu Xu sees the those natural principles: ultimately, he is a moral naturalist. But as we shall see, the concept of zi ran zhi li does not always enter this kind of elevated discourse on the thoughts of the sages. The concept enters Chinese thought in many interestingly varied ways.
Li

因天之則。
In fact, zi ran zhi li became something of a standard philosophical term, a keyword, in traditional China from the third century onwards. Quite often, though not always, the term is directly relevant to discussions on the various notions of "laws of nature" in traditional China. Rather surprisingly, this expression was not mentioned by Joseph Needham in his seminal essay on "Human Law and the Laws of Nature" in his Science and Civilisation in China, volume 2, pages 518-583. It is also absent in Derk Bodde's two important articles commenting on and supplementing Needham's survey, although it surely must have been noticed somewhere else in the extensive literature on the subject.
That the term zi ran zhi li is by no means rare or marginal can be seen from the distribution of its occurences in the great mid-Qing dynasty collection, the Sikuquanshu 四庫全書 [Complete writings from the Four Treasuries]:
Philosophers zibu 子部：670 Classics/scriptures jingbu 經部：627 Collections and chrestomathies jibu 集部：311
In the twenty-six dynastic histories, however, I find only 37 examples, but I have looked at these with special interest, because they show how the concept that concerns me entered broad non-technical discourse. I have also worked my way through the 109 occurrences in 70 texts of the Buddhist Tripiaka, and the occurrences of the phrase in 40 chapters of the 480 mostly pre-modern novels I have surveyed so far.
D. THE NOTION OF TRANSCENDENCE
The notion of a creator imposing pattern on the world of things is present in China, though never, as far as I know, the notion that that creator actually laid down "laws" for the behaviour of his creation. There are only ze 則 "rules", 常則 "constant rules", and more commonly, as history progresses, li 理 "patterns;" and, indeed, the all-important idiomatic zi ran zhi li 自然之理 the history of which we shall trace below. One text, interestingly, denies the existence of such fixed rules: Creator.
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This is from the Ming dynasty, but the same text also appears in a Song-dynasty work, followed there by an interesting further remark:
此理可信。 則淨土之說必可信。 If this Principle may be relied upon, then the theories of the Pure Land are necessarily also to be relied upon.
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This topos it would seem to be substantially older than the evidence of it I am here surveying.
We have already noted above how Tao Yuanming 陶淵明, in his own poetic mode, speaks not of laws obeyed but constant patterns conformed to: 天地長不沒， 山川無改時。 草木得常理， 霜露榮悴之。 Earth and Heaven endure forever, streams and mountains never change. Plants observe a constant pattern, withered by frost, restored by dew.
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The chang li 常 理 "constant pattern", Hightower's "constant rhythm," does not identify any law imposed. Neither does it refer to any abstract philosophical principle that might summarise or analyse what is at issue, but merely to an enduring and quite regular natural pattern, naturally followed. That seems to be the predominant way in which this matter was conceived in ancient China.
Another relevant way of speaking to keep in mind in the present conceptual context involves the common word dao 道 or "Way": 道常無為， 而無不為。 The Way/Nature does not take deliberate action, and yet there is nothing it does not get done.
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That dao which practises non-action here in fact comes remarkably close 56 to what we would, in the West, construe as "Nature."
The possibilities are still wide open for detailed philological studies of the nuances in the use of the terminological repertoire within the general semantic field of the invariant regularities of the things of this world. This applies to various Chinese traditions, but particularly to the Taoist and Buddhist traditions. Joseph Needham's seminal work of 1956 actually remains by far the finest effort in this direction in any language. And it would be entirely in the spirit of the great master that we should try to explore with a much finer focus the varieties of scientific discourse relating to our widely differing, and constantly evolving, Western notions which have come to go under the names of "Nature" and "Laws of Nature" in the long course of our intellectual history.
In the concluding section I shall therefore illustrate these possibilities by a survey of the concept zi ran zhi li in some Chinese Buddhist contexts. 
E. ZI RAN ZHI LI
亦自然之理耳。
When one constantly sets one's mind on a polite respect towards the Boddhisttva Guanyin then one will be able to free oneself from desires. Why should this be so? It is that when one sets one's mind on polite respect then wicked mental tendencies will of themselves cease: and that surely is no more than a (regular) pattern of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature. 75 4.2. A Qing-dynasty work by Chaoming 超溟 provides another perspective on such self-conditioning:
心生無妄。 心正身端。 自然之理。 Such is the (regular) pattern of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature. When the mind generates absence of misguidedness, then the mind is correct and the person is straight.
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The common naturalistic non-Buddhist psychological topos is repeated over and over again in the Buddhist scriptures of the time. When thought is light it flies up; when feelings are turgid they sink down. This is according to the (regular) patterns of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature. 78 4.5 Another passage by the same Jishi 濟時 focusses on the passions:
The general explanation is that one's (natural)endowment basically has no fire. It is because lewdness gets practised that it catches fire. When the fire manifests itself one will get burnt. Such are the (regular) patterns of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature. 
Retribution
Retribution is explained naturalistically as a manifestation of this zi ran zhi li.
5.1.
A work by Sengzhao 僧肇 (384-414) sets the theme early on, but certainly not as the first:
The way of retribution moves along in interlocking cycles. It is like sound and echo being in sequence, shape and shadow being adjusted to each other. This is the (regular) pattern of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature, and there is not the slightest … . 80 78 Xuzangjing, vol. 16, no. 317 Leng yan jing zheng jian, R091_p0177b13(00). 79 Xuzangjing, vol. 16, no. "When one acts as the disciple of the Buddha it is permitted to engage in trade and to manage a business for profit One must give fair measure of volume or length (of cloth), and one must not be deceitful towards others. To behave towards others according to principle, and not to offend against the higher spirits, that is the (regular) pattern of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature.
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And yet, the Buddhist sage undertakes to offend against this Pattern which makes carnivorous animals carnivorous, and cruel tyrants cruel, and hunters murderous. Of all these we are told that they "arise from Heaven and Earth." 6.2. An extraordinarily revealing but difficult passage from Táng-dynasty 84 Xuzangjing, vol. 62, no. 1185 Jing zhong jing you jing 徑 中 徑 又 徑 R109_p0431b03(00). A simlar passage may be found at Xuzangjing, vol. 62, no When one is being pulled by the good and bad deeds (of the past) then the "I" is not free. When the "I" is not free then there is no "I". This being according to the (regular) patterns of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature means that, according to the Principles of the Way, it is necessarily so. It is what the heretics call Nature, and about which they also say: it is so by virtue of Principle.
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Karmic regularities are explained as naturalistic regularities in a wide range of sources.
7.4.
In a Tang-dynasty work by Zhihong 志鴻 we find: 故得聲傳苦滅。 自然感應。 故言因緣相召。 自然之理不亡。 Thus, when one obtains the true message, bitterness disappears. In a natural fashion, there is a response to a stimulus. This is why it is said that karmic factors attract each other The (regular) patterns of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature are unfailing. Xuzangjing, vol. 19, no. 348 Weimo jing wu wo shu 維 摩 經 無 我 疏 , R030_p0268b18(00).
此感應道交自然之理也。
Thus that the Bodhisattva emerged in person, this is the result of the Principle interaction of stimulus and response according to the Regular Patterns of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature. This was the interaction between the Way of stimulus and response (on the one hand) and the (regular) pattern of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature (on the other). 96 7.11. The Qing-dynasty work compiled by Xinyuan Huolian 心 圓 火 蓮 contains a passage comparing moral inadequacy to a sickness: 夫不善猶疾病。 攻之則病去。 不攻則日甚。 故衲僧相求。 非特取樂也。 將以改不善也。 不善不去。 則道眼不明。 自然之理也。 Now failure to be good is like a disease. When one attacks it, then the disease disappears, but when one does not deal with it then it gets daily worse. That is why the monks seek each other out. It is not only to take their pleasure with each other. They wish thereby to correct their failures to be good. When this failure to be good is not got rid of then the Eye for the Buddhist truth has no clear sight. That is a (regular) pattern of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature. 97 7.12. A Qing-dynasty work by Wang Gengxin 王耕心 talks in the same way about a failure in contemplative concentration: 遂致不能專一。 則念佛之外。 雖別涉善念。 亦當與惡雜諸念同名妄念。 乃自然之理。 96 Xuzangjing, vol. 31, no. 611 Fa hua jing tong yi 法華經通義, R049_p0955b07(04). 97 Xuzangjing, vol. 85, no. 1592 An hei dou ji 揞黑豆集, R145_p1021a11(01).
Then one gets to the point where one cannot focus, so that one thinks of things other than the Buddha. Even if one touches upon other-good-thoughts one will certainly also, by the same reckoning, think in disorderly fashion, together with them, thoughts that are intermixed with evil. for that is the (regular) pattern of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature. 98 7.13. Finally, a Qing-dynasty work by Zhixiang 智 祥 sees intellectual interaction in the monastic community as another aspect of pattern-principle: 先舉大法綱領要旨。 審問大眾。 看眾中有會其意者否。 學者因不會其意。 故出眾請求利益。 遂形之而有問答。 此自然之理也。 First one raises the main meaning of the great web of the Buddhist dharma, and one asks the sangha about it, so as to see whether in the sangha there are those who understand the thoughts or not. [its purport ?] If a student does not grasp its purport he then steps out/forward from the community to seek useful instruction. Then things take form and there is a dialogue. This is a (social) (regular) pattern of What-is-So-of-Itself/Nature.
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I have found that non-Buddhist pre-modern literature, including the Daoist Canon, the 26 dynastic histories, neo-Confucian philosophical literature, and in particular vernacular pre-modern narrative literature provide ample additional evidence of traditional Chinese preoccupations with this key notion of zi ran zhi li. Moreover, many of the remaining 23 concepts that I have identified within the same semantic field mentioned above will deserve detailed study from the point of view of conceptual history if we ever wanted to arrive at any substantiated general statements on Chinese "concepts of Nature" based on more than anecdotal evidence from selected texts and arbitrarily selected terms. Our history of ideas must be solidly based in broad philological and 98 Xuzangjing, vol. 22, no. 401 Mo he a mi duo jing zhing lun 摩訶阿彌陀經衷論, R032_p0595b14(04). 99 Xuzangjing, vol. 64, no. 1266 Chan lin bao xun bi shuo Fu: Zhang Zhao zhuan xin fu 禪林寶訓筆說 附張照撰心賦, R113_p0761a01(01).
philosophical fieldwork. Our work on Chinese intellectual history is never going to be any more reliable than our philosophical as well as philological grasp of the relevant key concepts in the wide range of contexts, and of the wide variety of sources on which such an intellectual history must be founded.
